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Abstract
Is it possible to increase GDP, reduce unemployment and improve income 
distribution by providing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) better 
access to capital markets? In this study, we used a CGE model of Argentina 
to address this question and to evaluate the economy-wide net impact 
accounting for the reallocation of resources from other sectors. We find 
that although the benefits in question could be attained, SMEs should also 
be expected to self-exclude from programs that provide access to capital 
markets if that access is contingent upon higher formalization. Formalization 
can be expensive for SMEs. Additionally, this model estimated the gains in 
productivity necessary to incentivize SMEs to formalize and to voluntarily 
access capital markets; however, after gaining productivity, the SMEs created 
fewer jobs than initially expected. 
Keywords: Small and medium enterprises, CGE, access, capital markets, 
Argentina.
JEL Classification: C68, D58, O17, O54.
ECONOMY-WIDE EFFECTS OF IMPROVING SMALL AND 
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES’ ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS: 
AN APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSESSMENT
EFECTOS SOBRE LA ECONOMIA DE MEJORAR EL ACCESO DE LAS 
PEQUEÑAS Y MEDIANAS EMPRESAS AL MERCADO DE CAPITALES: 
UNA EVALUACION EN EQUILIBRIO GENERAL COMPUTADO
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Resumen
¿Es posible aumentar el PIB, reducir el desempleo y mejorar la distribución 
del ingreso mejorando el acceso de las pequeñas y medianas empresas 
(PyMEs) al mercado de capitales? En este estudio usamos un modelo de 
Equilibrio General Computado de Argentina para analizar esta cuestión y 
para evaluar el impacto general sobre la economía, de modo de tener en 
cuenta la reasignación de recursos desde otros sectores. Encontramos que si 
bien los beneficios podrían ser alcanzables, las PyMEs podrían autoexcluirse 
de programas que mejoren el acceso, si este fuera condicional a un mayor 
grado de formalización. La formalización puede ser costosa para las PyMEs. 
Además, el modelo estima las ganancias de productividad necesarias para 
inducir a las PyMEs a formalizarse y acceder voluntariamente al mercado 
de capitales; sin embargo, después de ganar productividad las PyMEs 
terminan creando menos puestos de trabajo que los esperados al inicio. 
Palabras clave: Pequeñas y medianas empresas, EGC, acceso, mercado de 
capitales, Argentina. 
Clasificación JEL: C68, D58, O17, O54.
1. INTRODUCTION
Is it possible to improve the manufacturing performance of SMEs and simultaneously 
increase GDP, reduce unemployment and improve income distribution by providing 
SMEs better access to capital markets? 
This paper uses the following approach to address that question. First, we use a 
general equilibrium model to account for the impact of the reallocation of resources 
between the SMEs and the rest of the economy. Second, we examine the possibility 
of self-exclusion of firms from programs providing access to capital markets that 
are conditional on higher formalization (because formalization could be costly as a 
result of higher effective taxes and required compliance with norms and standards). 
We used a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the economy of 
Argentina to address these two objectives. 
Why a CGE approach? There are great expectations and hopes on the capacity 
of SMEs to create jobs and help the Latin American economies to grow. Most of the 
available analyses and evaluations of that capacity do not take into account the cost 
of opportunity of resources, i.e. the cost for the economy of allocating other scarce 
factors to SMEs. The CGE evaluation gives the net results while at the same time 
takes into account changes in relative prices of goods and factors. 
To construct the data, we separated the manufacturers sector in the Social Accounting 
Matrix into SMEs and large enterprises/firms (LE). We obtained information on the 
SMEs from the Fundación Observatorio Pyme’s database. Separating activities by firm 
size in the Social Accounting Matrix was one of the contributions of this paper. The 
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comprehensive data that was required to model the firms by size was only available 
for the manufacturing sector. 
After dividing the manufacturing sector by size, the resulting groups had different 
characteristics. In the first group, SMEs, we included firms that operated on a lower 
scale, were less formal and were more labor-intensive on average. In the second 
group, we included large manufacturing firms, which were more capital-intensive, 
operated at a higher scale and were more formal (in terms of compliance with legal 
taxes and regulations). 
It has been argued that although SMEs face several potential regulatory constraints, 
they do not pay the full legal taxes and their level of evasion is higher. For example, 
Bertranou and Paz (2003) found a high correlation between the size of a firm and 
the protection of its workers. The high positive correlation between formality and 
the size of the firms and their scale of operation has been observed in the literature 
following the analysis of Rauch (1991) –see, for example, Neumeyer (2013), Galiani 
and Weinschelbaum (2007) and Busso et al. (2012).
It can also be argued that the larger a firm’s scale of operations, the higher the 
probability is of being detected and charged with taxes; therefore, firms must choose 
between gaining access to capital markets or maintaining a smaller operation and 
continuing to pay lower taxes. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a discussion 
of SMEs’ access to capital and formalization. In Section 3, we present the main 
characteristics of the SMEs in Argentina and the Social Accounting Matrix. In Section 
4, the characteristics of the model used in the simulations are described followed by 
a theoretical illustration of the analytical structure. Section 5 shows the results of the 
simulations. Finally, Section 6 presents the main conclusions. 
2. SMEs, ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS AND FORMALIZATION
SMEs’ limited access to capital markets and higher cost of capital, low productivity 
and informality have already been described by the Fundación de Investigaciones 
Económicas Latinoamericanas (1996) and by Auguste, Bebczuck and Sánchez (2013).
The higher costs of capital could be the result of unintended imperfections (such 
as asymmetries of information), but they could also be the natural response of capital 
markets to the low levels of firm formalization. 
However, our study shows that even when formalization could eliminate the 
difference in costs of capital with large and more productive firms, formalization is 
not the primary preference of SMEs. A recent report by the Fundación Observatorio 
Pyme (2013) found that SMEs that self-excluded from formal credit markets were an 
important proportion of the total manufacturers (60% in 2012)1. 
Stein, Pinar and Hommes (2013) emphasize that self-exclusion from formalization 
is a common situation in developing countries: firms remain informal because they do 
1 sic “… existe todavía una amplia proporción de PyMEs industriales de tamaño inferior a las ya bancarizadas 
que se autoexcluyen del sistema bancario…” (Fundación Observatorio Pyme, 2013, pp. 2).
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not have the proper incentives or the capacity to formalize. Moreover, some country 
studies show that simplifying registration channels and reducing its costs have had 
little effect to increase the formalization of firms2 -see Klewitz and Hansen (2011). 
A somewhat vicious cycle is inherent to this process; the low productivity of 
SMEs are to some extent the reason for their self-exclusion and informality, and to be 
sustainable, they compensate for higher (labor) costs per unit of product with informality 
and a lower level of tax compliance3. This in turn explains the higher capital costs.
However, we did not explore the causes of higher costs of capital in this study; 
instead, we considered higher capital costs to be a fact and explored the net results of 
eliminating the differential costs of capital while simultaneously increasing the taxes 
paid at the average of the corresponding industry. 
In our model, the units of analysis were not individual firms. Instead, we analyzed 
the sectors of SMEs and large firms. Those sectors could expand their activity or 
contract depending on how the allocation of capital and labor was incentivized. Thus 
the allocation of capital was not unidirectional; depending on the incentives, capital 
could move from SMEs to large firms or be reallocated from the large formal sector 
to the SMEs. The birth and death of firms were therefore not major events in this 
model; they responded to the incentives provided by the general equilibrium of the 
economy when all of the incentives were taken into consideration. This approach is 
consistent with the idea that not all firms want to grow and become formal because 
formalization could be costly in terms of tax and regulation compliance. However, there 
are consequences to the reallocation of resources regarding employment and income 
distribution because SMEs are on average more labor-intensive than larger firms.
An alternative view emphasizes instead the problems of development and its 
structural characteristics: difficult access to credit and capital, low compliance to tax 
and regulations and low productivity and specialization of SMEs in inferior goods. 
An interesting discussion of the characteristics of the SME sector was presented by 
Tybout (2000), in which the author identified two main characteristics of SMEs in 
less developed economies: limited access to capital markets and specialization in 
inferior-good markets. See also De Paula and Scheinkman (2007), Straub (2005) and 
Bennett and Estrin (2007). 
One key component of informality is tax evasion. Tax evasion is not that uncommon 
in the economies of Latin American Countries (LAC). A recent analysis of tax evasion 
in LAC was conducted by Gómez Sabaini and Jiménez (2012). They observed that 
SMEs were more informal and that the taxation of SMEs was not easily enforced. 
However, the need to combat this tax evasion creates a trade-off. Is the common 
belief that SMEs are critical for the creation of employment supported by evidence? 
Could the reallocation of resources absorb employment if legal taxes were enforced? 
2 De Giorgi and Rahman (2013) for Bangladesh, McKenzie and Sakho (2009) for Bolivia and Mel et 
al.(2013) for Sri Lanka.
3 Fundación Observatorio Pyme (2014) estimated that the productivity level of SMEs is around 74% 
lower that the LEs. 
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If SMEs are essential to creating employment opportunities, this could justify a 
light-handed approach to the issue of evasion. However, the critical question remains 
how this approach affects social welfare.
On the one hand, the role of SMEs seems to be important for the creation of 
employment in most LAC economies. SMEs are more labor-intensive than large firms, 
and their performance seems to be related to the performance of the economies of 
the region. Based on this perspective, it is important to recall the work of Marchand, 
Pestiau and Wibaut (1989), which showed that under unemployment, Ramsey taxes 
should be reduced when an industry is labor-intensive because higher employment 
could enhance social welfare even when the optimal taxation scheme is distorted4.
On the other hand, the consequences of a light-handed approach to the SMEs’ 
tax evasion could be a reduction in the average scale of firms, the loss of productivity 
at the level of the firms and a decrease in the economy’s TFP. 
3. A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX WITH SMEs ACCOUNTS
In this section, we present the data and the calibration procedure utilized to build 
a SAM for Argentina in 2010. We separated the firms in the manufacturing sector 
into two groups: SMEs and large firms/enterprises (LE). Additionally, we describe the 
necessary sources to estimate the specific accounts for the SMEs included in the SAM.
3.1. Characterization of SMEs
SMEs are more labor-intensive and are less formal than LEs. The technical efficiency 
of SMEs is central to the debate regarding their role in economic development. Some 
studies have found them to be more efficient than large enterprises in some industries 
but not in others, while other studies have found them to be less efficient overall 
(Little, Mazumdar and Page, 1987; Cortes, Berry and Ishaq, 1987; Liedholm and 
Mead, 1987). More recent research has reported that most SMEs are less efficient on 
average than their larger counterparts in five countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Colombia and Taiwan) but with a high dispersion, as some SMEs were as efficient as 
large companies (Batra and Tan, 2003). Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2011) observed that although small businesses were important contributors to total 
employment and job creation, they had a lower growth of productivity than large 
companies, which explains why job creation does not translate into faster growth.
We separated the firms in the manufacturing sector into two groups: SMEs and 
LEs. The first group, SMEs, included firms that operated at a lower scale, were less 
formal and were in general more labor-intensive than LEs. In the second group (LEs), 
capital-intensive firms were included. These firms operated at a higher scale and were 
more formal.
4 See also Koskela and Schöb (2001) and Böhringer, Boeters and Feil (2005).
20 REVISTA DE ANALISIS ECONOMICO, VOL.  31, Nº  1
National Accounts do not contain disaggregated data by company size; hence 
sectoral information was collected to represent the firms in the SAM. An aggregate 
manufacturing sector was initially created; small and medium manufacturer information 
was then collected and large industrial enterprises emerged as the difference between 
the two. The process used to represent the small and medium enterprises within the 
SAM is described next.
Studies that measure the share of SMEs in the GDP have investigated different 
periods and economic activities, which limit their comparability. Ayyagari, Beck and 
Demirgüc-Kunt (2003) estimated that from 1990 to 1999, all small and medium firms 
(not only manufacturing) accounted for an average of 54% of Argentina’s GDP. Peres 
and Stumpo (2000) estimated a contribution of 36% with respect to the manufacturing 
GDP in 1993. Additionally, the National Economic Census 2004 showed a share of 
24% of the GDP in the manufacturing sector. Given these mixed results, we used 
the most current information available to weight SMEs within manufacturing: sales 
statistics recorded by the federal fiscal agency (Administración Federal de Ingresos 
Públicos)5 in 2010. 
Based on the SMEs’ gross value of production, economic statistics were obtained 
from a specific survey of SMEs conducted by the Fundación Observatorio PyME (FOP)6. 
The survey was composed of a panel of 2500 industrial SMEs that were classified 
using the two-digit United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification. 
In terms of geographical coverage, the survey covered the industry nationwide. The 
variables surveyed included the firm’s characteristics, problems and expectations, 
investments, use of information technologies and communications, performance, 
human resources, finance and economic-financial relations, customers and suppliers 
and infrastructure and logistics7.
In particular, the statistics used were: the intermediate consumption/value added 
ratio, the capital/labor ratio and the proportion of exports to total sales. The remaining 
sales were distributed among other uses (intermediate consumption, final consumption 
and exports) based on the sales distribution of the aggregate manufacturing sector. 
The tax burden by firm size was obtained from the National Economic Census 2004. 
Table 1 presents a comparison of the manufacturing statistics by firm size.
SMEs represented 33% of the manufacturing industry’s gross output, 37% of 
the value added and 30% in terms of the intermediate consumption. SMEs were also 
more intensive in their use of labor than large manufacturing industries. SMEs had 
less participation in international markets. Finally, a lower tax burden on SMEs was 
observed when compared with larger firms.
5 Based on the definition of a SME used by the Secretariat of Small and Medium Enterprises and Regional 
Development (Resolution N0 21/2010), the term “SME” represents companies with annual sales of 
between $2.4 million and $111.9 million.
6 Periodically, and to cover the information gap between small and medium enterprises in this sector, 
the FOP generates surveys that produce relevant information on the structural characteristics and 
development of SMEs. This information was provided by the FOP through a joint project with the 
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE).
7 This survey considered SMEs to be firms with 10 to 200 employees.
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3.2. Social Accounting Matrix
The basic data for the model were obtained from a social accounting matrix 
(SAM) that also separated the manufacturing industry by firm size. We summarize 
the most critical aspects of data collection and treatment in the following paragraphs. 
Data on the global supply and demand and on the sectoral value added as  of 
2010 were obtained from the National Accounts published by the National Institute 
of Statistics and Census (INDEC). Information on the government accounts was 
obtained from the Ministry of the Economy (Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto). The 
information on national and local taxes was provided by the Administración Federal 
de Ingresos Públicos and by Provincial ministries. Regarding data on the demand side, 
household demand by good was obtained from the Survey of Household Expenditure 
2004/2005 and data on exported goods was from INDEC.
The model included 8 production sectors: 2 primary sectors (agriculture and 
mining), 2 manufacturing industry sectors (SME and LE) and 4 service sectors. The 
factors of production that were modeled were labor and capital. The 2008 matrix of 
factor payment created by the Generation of Income Account (CGI) of INDEC was 
updated using the cross-entropy method.
Table 2 presents the share of each sector in terms of gross value of production, 
value added, intermediate consumption, factors and tax burden.
The sectors that contributed the most to gross value of production were Other 
services, Manufacturing and Agriculture. SMEs comprised 33% of the Manufacturing 
industry in terms of gross output value, 37% in terms of VA and 30% in terms of 
intermediate consumption. Additionally, SMEs were more intensive in their use of 
labor than large manufacturing industries. A lower tax burden on SMEs industries 
was also observed when compared with larger firms.
On the demand side, consumer groups were divided into domestic households 
(rich and poor), the government, foreign consumers and foreign producers. The 
assumption of a small open economy was adopted, which implied that Argentina was 
a price taker in international markets.
TABLE 1
ARGENTINA, 2010. MANUFACTURING STRUCTURE BY FIRM SIZE
Sectors
Gross 
Output
Value Added / 
Gross Output
Labor / Value 
Added
Exports 
/ Gross 
Output
Net Tax 
Burden
Manufacturing: SME 33 41 45 6 9
Manufacturing: LE 67 33 21 30 13
Total Manufacturing 100 35 30 22 12
Source: Own elaboration based on AFIP, National Economic Census 2004 and FOP.
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Two types of households distributed by per capita income level were modeled. 
Poor Households corresponded to the first six deciles of per capita income, and Rich 
Households applied to the remaining four richest deciles8. In this model, households 
made expenditures on consumer goods and investments and pay taxes. Their income 
was provided based on the factor production payment and on transfers. Sectoral 
consumption was obtained from the Survey of Household Expenditure 2004/2005. 
The statistics on household income by type of factor and transfer were obtained from 
the Permanent Household Survey 2010.
In the model, government resources were tax revenues, social contributions and 
other non-tax revenues. Government expenses related to both the acquisition of goods 
and services for consumption and investment as well as to transfers to households. 
The income and expenditures of the public sector were consolidated for the federal 
administration, the provinces and the municipalities. Information on the government 
accounts was obtained from the Ministry of the Economy. 
The consumption of the rest of the world was generated from Argentina’s exports 
and goods from other countries. The production of the rest of the world was Argentina’s 
imports and transactions with other countries. Data on sectoral exports and imports 
were obtained from INDEC. The revenues and expenditures for factor income were 
subsequently obtained from the balance of payments from INDEC. 
For the modeled institutions, the balance of income and expenses was the net 
financial status, the latter being the financial account used for the closure of the SAM. 
For the government and households, financial status was determined by the difference 
8 40% of the richest households comprised 30.5% of the population in the Permanent Household Survey 
2010.
TABLE 2
ARGENTINA, 2010. PRODUCTION AND VALUE ADDED STATISTICS  
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL
Sector
Gross 
Output
Value 
Added
Intermediate 
Consumption
Labor Capital
Net Tax 
Burden
Agriculture, Forestry 
   & Fishing
7 9 5 7 15 7
Oil & Mining 2 3 1 1 5 9
Manufacturing: SME 11 8 13 9 6 9
Manufacturing: LE 22 13 31 7 9 13
Electricity, Gas & 
   Water
2 1 3 3 3 -27
Construction 9 6 12 4 7 6
Transport 6 6 7 5 7 3
Other Services 41 53 28 64 47 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 8
Source: Own elaboration based on INDEC.
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between the modeled revenues and expenditures, and for the rest of the world, it was 
the surplus/deficit on the current account of the balance of payments.
4. THE MODEL
In this section, we present the main features of the CGE model utilized for 
simulations and a simplified model that represented an economy with heterogeneous 
firms. 
4.1. Characteristics of the general equilibrium model used for the simulations
Our CGE model was static, had all of the basic properties of the Walrasian perspective 
and was numerically determined using GAMS/MPSGE9. Prices were computed 
to clear all of the markets except for the labor market because it was assumed that 
unemployment was present and therefore that there was a minimum wage constraint.
The economy was assumed to be small with respect to international markets. The 
rest of the world bought domestic exports and sold imports in addition to making 
bond transactions and collecting dividends from investments. 
Regarding the supply side, the production function in each sector was a Leontief 
function between value-added and intermediate input; one output unit required x percent 
of an aggregate of productive factors (labor, physical capital, financial capital and land) 
and (1–x) percent of intermediate inputs. The intermediate input function was a Leontief 
function of all of the goods, which was a strict complement to production. Value-added, 
on the other hand, was a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function of productive factors. Private 
savings, public savings and foreign savings were totaled to finance investments.
The demand side was modeled through two representative households (poor and 
rich), a government and an external sector. Households bought or sold bonds, invested 
and consumed in constant proportions (Cobb-Douglas) based on the remuneration of 
the factors they owned (and the government transfers they received). The selection of 
the optimal proportion of the goods consumed was obtained from a nested production 
function in the utility function through a cost minimization process. 
The government was represented as an agent that participated in investment 
markets, consumed and made transfers to households and had a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function; its main source of income was tax collection (although it also made financial 
transactions through bonds). The rest of the goods were assumed to be complementary, 
and the elasticity of the substitution between them was zero. Therefore, a CD utility 
function was attributed to the government. This decision was motivated by the property 
of the CD function to maintain the same share of each type of expense in the total, 
which seemed to be a neutral way of modeling the behavior of the government. Thus, 
it was assumed that each dollar of revenue was spent on different factors and goods 
in the same proportion as it was originally spent in the benchmark year. 
9 The solution of the model was obtained using the representation of General Equilibrium and using the 
Mixed Complementarities Approach. 
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For private agents, welfare changes were calculated using the Equivalent Variation, 
and the same measure was used for the public sector. We believed that this would 
represent a monetary proxy of the changes in society welfare stemming from the 
modifications in the availability of goods and services provided by the public sector 
(education, health and defense, for example). A simple change in revenue would not 
account for the changes in price of the goods, services and factors; using the Equivalent 
Variation thus helped generate an estimate of those changes.
The basic data for the model were organized into a social accounting matrix 
(SAM). As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the model was based 
on the economic transactions in a particular benchmark year. Benchmark quantities 
and prices – together with exogenously determined elasticities – were used to calibrate 
the functional forms.
Accordingly, the initial level of positive unemployment observed during the 
benchmark year was assumed; the evolution of the economy determined endogenously 
whether unemployment persisted. To represent unemployment, we assumed that there 
was a minimum real wage rate constraint and that the typical Walrasian mechanism 
did not apply to unemployment (however, it is possible to simulate different rules of 
adjustment of wages, e.g., constant in nominal terms).
4.2. A model of an economy with heterogeneous firms
A general equilibrium perspective considers changes in industrial structure, and 
the industrial structure is important in accounting for additional dimensions such as 
evasion, informality and creation of employment10. 
With regard to the industrial structure, the basic idea is to consider that firms 
in the industrial sector are heterogeneous with respect to four main categories: the 
productivity of the factors, the efficiency in the use of intermediate inputs, the quality 
of goods produced and the level of formality and of tax evasion.
The first two characteristics refer to internal efficiency. They address the question 
of whether it is possible to produce the same quantity of products using smaller 
quantities of capital, labor and/or intermediate goods and services. 
The third characteristic can be interpreted as an external effect that is related to 
the efficiency of the markets and not necessarily of the shareholders. To approximate 
this efficiency, it is assumed that if the goods produced are not of standard quality, the 
consumers will have to purchase more units to obtain the expected service, which will 
increase their expenses. The problem of quality could underlie a substantial portion 
of the discussion regarding the capacity of SMEs to access foreign markets. 
The fourth feature is often quoted as being intrinsic to SMEs, which can dwell 
in markets without complying with regulations or paying all of the necessary taxes. 
This characteristic is the issue that we explored with the CGE model. 
In this simplified version of the model, we considered evasion of labor taxes 
only, which are likely the easiest to evade; however, the model used for simulations 
10 Little work has been done concerning the presence of heterogeneous technologies in general equilibrium. 
See, for instance, Zhai (2008) and Balistreri and Rutherford (2013).
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encompassed several taxes and differing levels of evasion. Although we did not focus 
explicitly on productivity or efficiency, it should be noted that the above mentioned 
lack of efficiency or of quality (as well as the additional cost of capital, see below) 
could be compensated for with a lower degree of fulfillment of obligations and higher 
tax evasion. In the following section, we describe the addition of two characteristic 
syndromes that are typically attributed to SMEs: i) limited access to capital markets 
or a higher cost of capital due to imperfections, such as asymmetries of information, 
and ii) limited access to export markets. As we observed, these phenomena can be 
connected, as gaining access to capital markets can reduce costs and improve the 
competitiveness of firms in the international markets.
We considered an economy that consisted of only one private agent, three types 
of industrial firms (large firms that produce tradable goods, large firms that produce 
non-tradable goods and SMEs) and a public sector (that collects taxes and purchases 
goods and labor). 
We accounted for two mobile non-specific factors, labor (L) and a fraction of 
the total capital (Km), while the rest of the capital was assumed to be specific and 
not mobile between industries. Thus, even when the production functions exhibited a 
constant return to scale, there continued to be profits associated with the remuneration 
of specific capital. 
Regarding access to capital markets, it was assumed that there were no quantitative 
constraints. Instead, we assumed that SMEs had to pay a mark-up on mobile capital 
to replicate their differential costs for accessing capital markets. 
Labor unemployment was also included, which was associated with a rule that 
determined the wage rate (indexation to prices of goods faced by final demand). 
The economy was considered to be small with respect to the rest of the world’s 
economies.
4.2.1. Households
The budget constraint of the households sector was:
P1TC1T + P1NC1N + P2C2 + PMM =W L
0 −Un( )+
π1T +π1N +π2 + rmK1Tm + rmK1Nm + rmK2m 1+ γ( )
(1)
where Pi was the price of the goods produced by the larger firms, indicated with sub-
index 1 (T for tradable goods and N for non-tradable goods) and by SMEs, sub-index 
2; PM was the price of imported goods; C1T, C1N and C2 represented the household 
demand for domestic goods and M represented the household consumption of imported 
goods. The sources of income for the household were labor earnings determined by 
wage (W) and actual employment, the difference between the endowment of labor 
(L0) and unemployment (Un), profits of the firms (πi) and the remuneration (rm) of 
mobile capital and the Km employed in firms 1 and 2. In the case of SMEs, there was 
an additional cost of capital indicated by γ. 
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The utility function U of a representative household depended on the consumption 
of C1T, C1N, C2 and M, and it adhered to habitual regularity conditions. The first order 
conditions for the determination of consumption of goods produced by both types of 
firms were calculated as:
U1T /U2 = P1T / P2 1+θ( )  (2)
U1N /U2 = P1N / P2 1+θ( ) (3)
U1 /UM = P1 / PM . (4)
The general model assumed that the production functions were homogenous in 
degree one and that those profits became zero, although a certain amount of specific 
non-mobile capital was included with a specific remuneration. The term “positive 
profits” can be considered another way of depicting the remuneration of specific 
non-mobile capital. A relevant parameter implicit in equation (3) was determined a 
priori to be the elasticity of the substitution between goods produced by large firms 
and SMEs; in the model, the basic simulations assumed that this elasticity was one. 
4.2.2. Firms
The profit function of the large firms for tradable goods was:
π1T = P1T − a1TP2 −m1TPM( )FT L1T ,K1Tm( )−WL1T 1+ t( )− rmK1Tm , (5)
where FT was the (neoclassical) production function and was dependent on labor 
employed in the sector L1T and on mobile capital, K1Tm. The parameter a1T was the 
input requirement of the goods produced by SMEs per unit of production of large 
firms. The input requirement of imported goods was m1T.
The conditions for the maximization of profits were determined to be:
P1T − a1TP2 −m1TPM( )F ʹ′TL L1T ,K1Tm( )−W 1+ t( ) = 0, (6)
P1T − a1TP2 −m1TPM( )F ʹ′TK L1T ,K1Tm( )− rm = 0. (7)
The profit function for non-tradable goods and services was: 
π1N = P1N − a1NP2 −m1NPM( )FN L1N ,K1Nm( )−WL1N 1+ t( )− rmK1Nm , (8)
where FN(L1N, K1Nm) was the (neoclassical) production function that was determined 
by the labor and capital employed in the sector. The parameter a1N was the input 
requirement of the goods produced by SMEs per unit of production of non-tradable 
goods and services. 
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The corresponding first order conditions for the maximization of profits were:
P1N − a1NP2 −m1NPM( )F ʹ′NL L1N ,K1Nm( )−W 1+ t( ) = 0, (9)
P1N − a1NP2 −m1NPM( )F ʹ′NK L1N ,K1Nm( )− rm = 0. (10)
4.2.3. SMEs
Profits were defined in a similar manner: 
π2 = P2 − a2TP1T − a2NP1N −m2PM( )H L2,K2m( ) /
1+ε( )−WL2 1+ tv( )− rmK2m 1+γ( ).
(11)
In this expression, the production function was H(L2, K2m), and there were 
three additional parameters: ε, v and γ. The first parameter represented an index of 
productivity in the use of labor and capital; a higher level of ε indicated a lower level 
of productivity. Parameter v stood for the degree of evasion of labor taxes (0 ≤ v ≤ 1); 
a lower of level of v implied a lower effect rate tv. The additional cost of capital faced 
by SMEs was indicated by γ; a higher level of this parameter indicated that the firm 
would have to pay an additional cost to access one unit of capital.
The profit maximization conditions for those firms were:
P2 − a2TP1T − a2NP1N −m2PM( ) ʹ′HL L2,K2m( ) / 1+ε( )−W 1+ tv( ) = 0. (12)
P2 − a2TP1T − a2NP1N −m2PM( ) ʹ′HK L2,K2m( ) / 1+ε( )− rm 1+γ( ) = 0. (13)
4.2.4. Government
The tax revenue R of the government was calculated by the collection of taxes:
R = tW L1+ vL2 + Lg( ). (14)
This revenue was devoted to the purchase of goods and labor, which were indicated 
by Gi and Lg: 
G1T = g1TR / P1T , (15)
G1N = g1NR / P1N , (16)
G2 = g2R / P2 1+θ( ) , (17)
Lg = gLR /W 1+ t( ). (18)
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The corresponding shares were determined by the constants g1T, g1N, g2 and 
gL, respectively. Those shares were constant; thus, equations (15) to (18) could be 
obtained from the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function attributed to the 
government, as suggested in Ballard et al. (1985). As a result, a measure of the welfare 
of the public sector could be introduced. In the simulations, the Equivalent Variation 
was used both for households and for the public sector.
4.2.5. Market equilibrium
We were able to characterize the market equilibrium for this economy (notice 
that this was pseudo-equilibrium because we admitted the existence of involuntary 
unemployment). The model was determined by computing a vector of prices (and 
quantities) such that households maximized welfare, firms maximized profits and all 
of the markets were simultaneously in equilibrium. 
The demand for labor plus unemployment had to be equal to the total endowment L0.
L1T + vL1N + L2 + Lg +Un = L
0. (19)
As there was unemployment, it was necessary to include a rule regarding the 
determination of wages above the equilibrium level. This rule was assumed to be 
represented by: 
W =ϕ1TP1T +ϕ1NP1N +ϕ2P2, (20)
where φi was the share of good i in the Consumers Price Index. Notice that higher 
labor taxes (the only type of tax considered in the simplified version) increased the 
prices of final demand and therefore increased nominal wages. 
Equation (20) had to be interpreted in a more general form as a minimum wage 
condition; thus, the simulations allowed the possibility of increasing real wages under 
full employment. 
The market for mobile factors illustrated the equalization of demand for capital 
and supply of mobile capital owned by households, represented by Km0:
K1Tm +K2Tm +K2m = Km
0 . (21)
The last three equations represent the market equilibrium conditions for goods 
produced by large firms and by SMEs in the economy:
C1T +G1T + a2TH L2,K2m( ) / 1+ε( )+ X = FT L1T ,K1Tm( ) , (22)
C1N +G1N + a2NH L2,K2m( ) / 1+ε( ) = FN L1N ,K1Nm( ) , (23)
C2 +G2 + a1TFT L1T ,K1Tm( )+ a1NFN L1N ,K1Nm( ) = H L2,K2m( ) / 1+ε( ). (24)
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The left-hand side of these equations represents the demand: private consumption, 
government expenditure of the respective good and demand of the good as a production 
input of the rest of the economy. Notice that a gain in productivity (an increase in 
parameter ε) reduces the demand for intermediate uses per unit of value added. 
This was a general equilibrium model, which in principle was consistent because 
it contained 24 unknown variables to be determined: 1) the demand for labor in every 
sector and unemployment, L1T, L1N, L2, Lg and Un; 2) the demand for mobile capital, 
K1Tm, K1Nm and K2m; 3) the prices of factors and goods, W, rm, P1N and P2; 4) the 
household and government demand for goods, C1T, C1N, C2, G1T, G1N and G2; 5) the 
profits and revenue of the public sector, π1T, π1N, π2, and R; and 6) the export X and 
import of goods M. 
4.3. Calibration and Validation
To calculate the benchmark and counterfactual solutions, we used MPSGE 
as developed by Tom Rutherford based on the works of Mathiesen (1985), who 
showed that economic general equilibrium can be expressed as a set of equalities and 
inequalities (mixed complementary programming). The program includes a procedure 
of self-calibration that facilitates its use and a change in specification of elasticities 
and structural characteristics. Thus, provided that the SAM was correctly balanced, 
the first solution of the model computed the parameters that enabled the replication 
of the benchmark year data. The counterfactual exercises were in effect comparative 
statistic simulations using the calculated parameters. Therefore, calibration was 
obtained in the first run of the model, which is a standard procedure for this type 
of research (see Chisari and Romero (2009) for a summary of the methodology and 
references). We have used this methodology for different countries in Latin America 
as well as for the analysis of economies with sectors that are under regulation (see 
Chisari, Estache and Romero, 1999).
For validation, we attempted to replicate the dynamic path of the economy. To 
do so, we identified the main shocks (of policy or exogenous) that impinged upon 
the economy in year t+1 and tried to replicate the observed main macroeconomic 
indicators based on the information regarding changes in stocks, technology and 
labor force with respect to year t. One key variable that was consistently useful in 
validating the model was the degree of mobility of capital, i.e., the proportion of 
capital employed by production sectors that was not specific but was mobile. Thus, the 
validation included the determination of the proportion of capital that was mobile for 
the first two years, which for Argentina was approximately 12.5%. A more thorough 
discussion is presented in Chisari, Maquieyra and Miller (2012).
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of the analysis of the general equilibrium 
effects derived from potential programs enabling access to capital markets conditional 
on higher formalization. Formalization was considered to imply greater effective taxes 
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and compliance with norms and standards. Additionally, we estimated the minimum 
level of productivity improvement necessary to prevent the self-exclusion of SMEs 
from these programs.
Based on these objectives, we conducted three groups of simulations: a) access 
of SMEs to capital markets and access conditional on formalization (tax compliance), 
b) tax substitution and equal-yield-replacements and c) compensatory productivity 
gains of SMEs.
The results are summarized using a set of indicators for the economies. We included 
the change in GDP and trade balance and the equivalent variations for the poor, the 
rich and the public sector. The last indicator (equivalent variation of the public sector) 
is less standard, but as has already been argued, we assumed a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function for the government because that function implies constancy of the share of 
different types of expenses. We also included the average rate of profit in primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors to appraise how the industrial structure responded or 
would respond to the new relative prices. 
Using the simple version of the model, we considered the following comparative 
exercises:
a. Elimination of a differential cost of capital (equivalent to reductions of γ). 
b. Increase in the formalization of SMEs (represented as an increase in v, the tax 
differential between SMEs and LEs) 
c. Increase in the productivity required to compensate for the negative effects of 
formalization (ε < 0)
As described above, it has been argued that SMEs do not have access to capital 
markets and that they have to pay an additional cost per unit of capital. Regarding the 
model, that argument is equivalent to saying that γ is positive and most likely very high. 
A policy that is oriented to reduce that cost could help increase the scale of SMEs, 
but it could also foster some substitution of labor for capital. Large firms would also 
see an increase in the price of capital, which would reduce the demand for labor.
 Auguste, Bebczuk and Sánchez (2013) supported the idea that financial constraints 
influence SMEs. In our model, this constraint was approximated by a mark-up. 
However, the possibility that SMEs would choose to not enter formal capital markets for 
reasons other than the direct marginal cost of funds cannot be ruled out. For example, 
accessing formal capital markets could require the disclosure of certain information 
about the firm, including projects in development as well as sensible information on 
tax bases. Hence, a firm might face a trade-off between the lower cost of funds and 
higher taxes due to formalization. The net effect of a movement to formalization that 
reduces the cost of capital has to be complemented by an evaluation of the effective 
taxes paid by the firm (e.g., those charged on labor expenses).
Accordingly, two exercises were performed. In the first one, we reduced γ, and 
in the second, we assumed that this reduction was accompanied by an increase in v, 
the parameter that indicates tax compliance. 
Our benchmark included the higher cost of capital paid by SMEs. Therefore, to 
represent the differential interest rate, we divided the remuneration of mobile capital 
into two parts: the mobile capital at market remuneration and the differential cost of 
capital or mark-up charged on the normal remuneration of capital. We modeled the 
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differential cost of capital as an additional mark-up on the remuneration of capital by 
SMEs that was collected by the richest households. The elimination of this mark-up 
allowed for an estimate of the effect of a program to provide SMEs access to capital 
markets. The simulations considered a differential rate of 10% that was paid by the 
SMEs (Table 3).
An increase in GDP was observed. The change was slight because of the reduced 
proportion of manufacturing SMEs in relation to the whole economy. In addition, 
manufacturing SMEs showed a significant increase in activity level, but this was 
accompanied by a reduction in the activity level of the large manufacturers and of 
other sectors of the economy. This result was due to the substitution at the consumption 
level of other goods for products of SMEs and to the fact that the capital moved from 
the rest of the economy to the SMEs. Accompanying this reallocation of capital was a 
reduction in the rate of unemployment because SMEs are labor intensive and require 
more workers than the number of positions that would be eliminated in other sectors. 
There was also a fiscal reduction, as SMEs pay lower effective taxes than the 
large manufacturers.
The reduction in the cost of capital included a gain in the international competitiveness 
of SMEs. Consequently, their exports were the main driver of the increase in activity 
level11. SMEs could face a number of different restrictions when accessing foreign 
markets. Therefore, to obtain the benefits of eliminating the differential cost of capital, 
it would be necessary to implement polices directed at removing those restrictions.
The poor showed an increase in welfare that was greater than that of the rich. This 
result was due to the reduction in the differential cost of capital that was eliminated, 
as it was assumed that this cost comprised part of the total income of the rich.
The third column of Table 3 shows the results of reducing the 10% cost of capital 
differential when the reduction is matched with an increase in the effective taxes 
paid by SMEs, thus equating the taxes paid by SMEs with those paid by the large 
manufacturing firms (the same average effective tax). 
This simulation showed a full reversal of the results. There was a decrease in 
GDP, an improvement in fiscal result, an increase in the level of unemployment and 
a reduction in the activity level and in the rate of profits of SMEs. 
This simulation confirmed the belief that many firms would self-exclude from 
gaining better access to the capital markets if formalization, and thus tax compliance, 
were required.
What was more notable about these results was that the economy was weakened 
by the decrease in the activity level of the SMEs and that there was a reduction in 
the activity level of all of the other industrial sectors. The main reason for this result 
could be that because SMEs were paying higher taxes, including taxes on labor, the 
rate of unemployment increased, which reduced the level of household consumption 
and investment. 
11 We simulated the elimination of the cost of capital differential maintaining the benchmark level of 
SME’s exports. We observed that the profit rate and production of SMEs also remained close to the 
benchmark levels.
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TABLE 3
SIMULATIONS OF ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKET, FORMALIZATION  
AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS
Indicators
Elimination of 
Cost of capital 
Differential 
Tax rates 
equalization of 
SME & LE
Tax rates 
equalization 
with ex-
ante fiscal 
neutrality 
Productivity 
gains required 
to compensate 
fiscal pressure on 
SME
Macroeconomic Indicators        
 GDP 0.14 –3.64 –1.25 0.60
 Trade balance 0.34 –3.69 0.24 0.56
 Unemployment rate (base= 7.75) 7.46 12.87 9.60 8.94
 Fiscal Result –0.72 –0.87 –2.33 1.95
Welfare Indicators        
 Welfare of the Poor 0.29 –3.57 –1.79 0.82
 Welfare of the Rich 0.21 –4.31 –1.04 –0.22
Rate of profit        
 Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing –0.25 –0.99 4.07 –0.81
 Manufacturing: SME 3.44 –2.93 1.56 0.00
 Manufacturing: LE –1.03 –7.52 –0.14 –3.50
 Services 1.02 –4.71 –0.32 1.83
Sectoral activity level        
 Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing –0.63 –0.49 1.19 –1.05
 Oil & Mining –0.54 0.11 1.66 –0.71
 Manufacturing: SME 4.26 –12.71 –9.84 8.50
 Manufacturing: LE –1.20 –4.74 –0.74 –2.97
 Electricity, Gas & Water 0.19 –3.40 –0.94 0.68
 Construction 0.09 –2.88 –1.02 0.75
 Transport 0.05 –3.49 –0.72 0.13
 Other Services 0.03 –2.10 –0.52 1.00
Source: own elaboration.
The negative impact on the economy was mitigated when the increase in effective 
taxes paid by SMEs was compensated with a reduction in the average rate of effective 
taxes for the whole economy. Although this helped sustain the activity level, it was 
not sufficient to recover the benchmark levels of the economy and of the SMEs. 
However, after formalization and gaining access to capital markets, SMEs did 
become more productive12. The gains in productivity of the SMEs were equivalent 
to the reductions in parameter ε. Those gains reduced the costs of production and the 
use of intermediate goods. Accordingly, two main consequences can be expected. 
12 However, SMEs could witness gains in quality too, which would be a gain in efficiency for the market; 
the firms would most likely not have a large enough incentive to make the necessary efforts to obtain 
those changes unless they were for free or were forced by competitive conditions. Whatever the case, 
the question is how the economy would react to those quality gains, which would be observed in the 
impact on relevant variables, such as employment. Quality can also be a critical variable to gaining 
access to export markets –see González and Hallak (2013). Although the main factor that González 
and Hallak found was knowledge, in our model, SMEs could face difficulties if they had to increase 
quality to gain access to export markets because that would require additional capital and, as already 
mentioned, more formalization and consequently an increase in effective taxes.
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On the one hand, there could be a direct decrease in employment. On the other hand, 
indirectly, an increase in the demand for the goods produced by SMEs could be 
observed because a reduction in costs would transfer to some extent to prices; this 
would increase SMEs’ production. 
Therefore, we estimated the necessary productivity gain after reforms to sufficiently 
compensate SMEs to equalize their rate of profit with that of the benchmark. We found 
that that this productivity gain would need to be approximately 20%. 
As the GDP grew, we observed that although the activity level of SMEs increased, 
the rate of unemployment remained high. This is not surprising, as SMEs are more 
productive and therefore need to hire fewer workers. 
This result demonstrates a negative effect of a policy oriented to reduce unemployment 
by granting SMEs access to capital markets. 
6. MAIN RESULTS AND FINAL REMARKS
This paper examines the impact of facilitating SMEs’ access to capital markets 
using a computable general equilibrium model of Argentina. 
Although there is abundant literature on this topic, most of which emphasizes 
the possible economic gains by eliminating the differential cost of capital paid by 
SMEs, there have been no quantitative studies. In this study, we used a CGE model 
to investigate the economy-wide impact of a policy removing the differential cost of 
capital, i.e., considering the repercussions on other sectors.
First, the simulations showed that the economy would gain from better access of 
SMEs to capital markets. However, this was at the cost of reducing the activity level of 
other sectors. Additionally, although the rate of unemployment was reduced, this result 
was not as significant as expected. Moreover, the economic gains were at the expense 
of the fiscal result because SMEs pay lower effective taxes than the other industries.
Second, if the elimination of the differential cost of capital paid by SMEs was 
conditional on formalization and tax compliance, then SMEs would have an incentive 
to self-exclude from that type of program to remain informal and excluded from capital 
markets. Additionally, our results showed that a reduction in the average effective 
taxes for the economy would not be enough to compensate SMEs.
Finally, when higher formalization and access to capital markets was complemented 
with an increase in the productivity of SMEs, the economy grew again, and SMEs 
reached the profit rates of the benchmark. However, the rate of unemployment was 
higher than at the benchmark because the productivity gain reduced the SMEs’ 
required number of workers. 
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